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FSA News:
In the last editorial I talked about improving our route network and connections and have since invested hundreds of hours into this project so if you haven't flown from a UK airport recently then hopefully you will be pleasantly surprised by the available choices when you next book a flight. We are still a long, long way off from where I want us to be in terms of numbers of destinations and largely because of my scatter-gun approach of trying to cover everywhere at once no one airport is ‘finished’, instead it’s more of a small increase but at a national level.
That said, Manchester, Stansted, Southampton, Southend, Liverpool, Cardiff, Exeter and Bristol have all had significant additions:  return trips to new destinations suitable for a variety of aircraft types. All have had at least 30 routes added with some significantly more and almost all major airports have had at least some additional routes (Bournemouth, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Inverness, Birmingham, London City, Heathrow and Gatwick in particular). Many more are planned - I add an average of 20 every week which doesn't sound a lot but considering what happens for each route it's quite an effort!
“What goes into creating a route?” - well, thank you for asking! :p
Every new route starts with researching the departure airport (using Wikipedia and the airports' own websites) to determine all the real-world connections and aircraft suitable to fly them taking range and runway length into account. In addition I look for similar suitable and plausible destination airports to increase choice and accommodate pilots preferences, sometimes this is influenced by the availability of free and pay-ware scenery for the airport. Then construction of a timetable is attempted for the sake of realism (although flights can be flown at any time the pilot chooses), accounting for distance and time zones (all times are in UTC) and airport operating hours. Then flight-plans are generated using Simbrief and/or RouteFinder and run through PFPX to find/correct any errors using the current AIRAC. The process is repeated for the return leg, hopefully capturing all the aircraft-types the outbound leg had so no-one is left stranded. Finally a ticket-price is determined - usually a lovely 11% surcharge is slapped on top of the standard fare - who said we're a budget airline! Once the passengers are sufficiently fleeced, err, I mean we optimise the load factor to ensure that smaller aircraft operating at the limits of their range (and therefore sacrificing passenger numbers for maximum fuel) can still turn a profit. NOTAM - UK Direct takes a dim view of any pilot caught sacrificing passengers for any reason and shall have their crew-room privileges reduced! That means no more comfy chair by the TV.

After many years of stagnation FSA has seen a flurry of changes, and the odd one has vexed some pilots. There are now daily parking charges for when an aircraft is left away from its designated home base. Wear and Tear on aircraft  has always required maintenance but now the passage of time decreases an aircrafts serviceability too so that unused aircraft will deteriorate too. Once an aircraft goes without maintenance for a year or longer then penalties start to apply. I don't have the full details but ultimately long-time unserviced aircraft cannot be moved or used. We can also mitigate the costs of maintenance by having our own facilities - as long as we can get the aircraft to them on time! We’re a big enough VA to absorb the financial implications (especially when charging exorbitant fares!) but a perhaps unintended side-effect of these changes mean we have more aircraft at our hubs - meaning more choices which goes hand-in-glove with having more routes to fly too.

Being the caring-sharing VA that we are, you will also note that the Fleet roster is swelling with new aircraft repaints - As you scroll down you will find there has been a multitude of aircraft that have passed by the painters spray-sheds, both free-ware and pay-ware. Take a look at Charley Zulu’s efforts, he is a master at making factory-fresh repaints look 30 years old :)  As I write this you can’t actually download most of them as we are awaiting permission from the copyright owners to use them. I also have some part-painted ATR’s in the offing but were put aside to devote time to the routes. So in the meantime just enjoy the video (if I’ve finished one) or the screenshots otherwise! And thank you Charlie.

There is the usual mix of news and videos too so I won't preempt them here but not as much as usual due to my time spent elsewhere - did I mention I was adding new routes? No? Oh, well, let me tell you......... :p


Newshound aka Mark UKD171

The good thing about flying solo is it's never boring.
Steve Fossett

UKDirect Boeing 767-300ER G-UKIN. This is the SkySpirit2010 Model V.5 from our fleet, it has been available for a few years but I managed a successful flight from Tel Aviv to Manchester using P3Dv4. I had to turn the landing lights off for a night approach as they light up the cockpit interior and the window reflection makes forward viewing difficult, but it works and sounds great. This screenshot is taken as the sun is setting over some Greek islands in the distance.

Do you have a screen shot you are proud of? Please send it in and share it with us.
To enter in the next e-magazine send your entries to Newshound: mark[at]planecrazy.me.uk 

Don't worry about editing pictures, sending them as a full size bmp is best and I’ll edit them for Directions

UKDirect Historic Fleet Additions  [1.54]

A short video of UKDirect Historic Fleet aircraft, mostly painted by Charley Zulu for UKDirect pilots to use. They are freely available for download from the Fleet page.
 

Boeing

There was nothing more the pilots could have done.

As alarms sounded in their cockpit, the captain and first officer struggled to regain control of their stricken aircraft.
They were far too close to the ground, and needed to gain altitude. Yet when Capt Yared Getachew tried to guide the nose of the Boeing 737 upwards, an electronic system forced it down again.

Simply pulling back on his control column wasn't enough. So he used the trim switch as well, but a few seconds later, those adjustments were automatically reversed.
The stick-shaker was making the control-column shake in his hands, warning that the aircraft was in danger of stalling and falling out of the sky. A harsh robotic voice called out “don't sink” three times, indicating that the plane was losing height.
Together, he and First Officer Ahmednur Mohammed Omar worked quickly to find a solution. They flicked switches on the centre console to disable part of the electronics, and began using manual controls instead, in an attempt to make the plane fly normally.

Regaining control was difficult. By now the aircraft was gathering speed, and aerodynamic forces were building rapidly; it's likely they had simply become too great for the pilots to fight against using manual controls. Whatever the reason, they turned the electronics back on and Capt Getachew tried once more to raise the nose of the aircraft, using the thumb switch on his controls. With power assistance restored, the aircraft responded. Briefly it began to climb.
But then, inexorably, the process was reversed as the computers intervened yet again. Another alarm was now chirping urgently, warning that the speed of the plane had become dangerously high, as it began to dive towards the ground.
In desperation, Capt Getachew called on his co-pilot for help. Together, they hauled back on their control columns, using their combined strength, in a last-ditch effort to overcome the forces arrayed against them with sheer muscle power.

The dive became steeper and steeper, and the aircraft fell faster and faster, until it slammed into the ground at more than 500mph, just six minutes after taking off. One hundred and fifty seven people from 35 different countries died. The weather was good, and the visibility was clear. The aircraft, a Boeing 737 Max 8, was new. 

Just five months beforehand, a near identical Boeing 737 Max 8, operated by Indonesian carrier Lion Air, had set out on another routine journey from the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. The flight to the western city of Pangkal Pinang was meant to last little more than an hour. But moments after taking off, the pilots found themselves in serious trouble.
They were fighting for control, mystified as the aircraft seemed to take on a mind of its own, trying to descend when it was supposed to be climbing.
They had no idea what was going on. Each time they tried to bring the nose up, their actions would be reversed a few seconds later as automatic systems forced it down again. This happened more than 20 times, with the aircraft bucking erratically through the sky. Air traffic controllers became worried when they noticed on their radar screens that it was descending. On the radio, one of the pilots told them he had a “flight control problem”.

As the crew tried to work out what had gone wrong, they became even more confused, because their instruments were indicating different altitudes. They didn’t know how high the plane was, or how fast it was going. Eventually, they lost control altogether. The aeroplane went into a steep dive that couldn't be recovered, and crashed at high speed into the Java Sea.

One hundred and eighty nine people lost their lives.

Two remarkably similar accidents, just five months apart, involving the same brand new aircraft design. Within days of the second crash, investigators had noted “clear similarities” between them. So was there a common cause?
Suspicion quickly focused on a piece of flight control software designed to operate in the background, without the pilot even being aware of it.
It was meant to make the plane easier and more familiar to fly for pilots who were already used to the previous generation of Boeing 737. It was designed to curb a tendency for the 737 Max’s nose to rise too much, when it was already pitched up at a steep angle.
But it appeared to have been activated at the wrong time and to have forced the nose of the aircraft down when it was supposed to be climbing.

The elevators were being moved into the wrong position by the flight computer. When the crew tried to correct them, they simply moved back.
Boeing insisted its aircraft was safe, but issued a bulletin to airlines explaining what could happen, and what to do.
In this case, pilots were told to follow steps set out in an existing checklist which they are required to memorise, designed to help them deal with an abnormal situation affecting the elevators. It told them to turn off power to the automatic control system, by flipping two cut-off switches. They could then trim the elevators manually, using the trim wheel in the cockpit.
Boeing was confident that if pilots followed these instructions the plane could be flown safely. Nevertheless, it began developing new software to eradicate the problem. This was still being worked on when Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 set out on its final journey.

The cause of the two accidents was very probably the same and according to an interim report, the Ethiopian Airlines pilots reacted to the emergency as the manufacturer had told them to. But it didn't save their lives, or those of their passengers.

Now, Boeing is facing serious questions - about whether it was right to assume the aircraft was safe, or whether it should have taken more radical steps after the Lion Air crash and consequently the close relationship between the aerospace giant and the US body that is meant to regulate the industry, the Federal Aviation Administration, has come under scrutiny as never before.

What’s wrong with the 737 Max?

The new 737 MAX has become the fastest-selling aircraft in Boeing's history but the Max isn't entirely new. It was the latest version of Boeing's 737, a model which first flew in 1967. Since then, the 737 had been periodically reinvented and re-engineered to keep it flying into the 21st Century.
The Max is the fourth generation of the 737 family - cleaner, quieter and much more efficient than its predecessors.
Boeing really needed it to succeed.
Four years before the launch, the company had had a serious problem. Its great European rival Airbus was already developing a new version of its A320 - a direct competitor to the 737.
Rivalry between Boeing and Airbus has always been intense. The 737 and A320 are the workhorses of the aviation world, with thousands of them plying their trade on short and medium-haul routes around the globe every day.

They have provided a steady and reliable source of profit for both companies, with the market split relatively evenly between them. But the new A320 threatened to give Airbus a big advantage. The modified aircraft would have revised aerodynamics, and would be fitted with a choice of new engines. This would enable it to become quieter and to produce fewer emissions, as well as giving it the choice of a longer range or a higher payload.

But more importantly it would be much cheaper to operate. In recent years, fuel has typically accounted for 20% to 25% of carriers’ operating expenses. According to Airbus, the new engine would be up to 15% more fuel efficient. Airbus began racking up orders for the overhauled plane, christened the A320neo (for new engine option), while demand for the 737 flagged.
Boeing simply had to respond.
Boeing had been studying options for a possible 737 replacement for several years but ‘the longer Boeing left it, the further it would fall behind,’ explains pilot and 737 expert Chris Brady. But at the time, its 787 Dreamliner - billed as a groundbreaking and super-efficient design - was years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget.
The company's board appeared reluctant to give the go-ahead for another plane to be designed from scratch. The only other option was to re-engineer its existing aircraft and fit new, more efficient engines.
As commercial pressures mounted, and amid signs one of its main customers, American Airlines, was about to place a major order with Airbus, Boeing gave the 737 Max programme the green light. Although the A320 and the 737 look very similar, the engineering challenges faced by the two manufacturers were very different. The A320 is fundamentally a much more modern aircraft, one which began flying in the late 1980s. It is taller than the 737, which is still based on its 1960s airframe.
For Boeing, this meant installing the new engines was far from easy. A solution had to be found. But that solution had unintended consequences.

When it was introduced in the 1960s, the 737 was built to be low to the ground to make it easier to load baggage and get passengers aboard using stairs - a particular advantage at the small, regional airports it was designed to serve. The 737-200 was designed with long, thin engines but new developments in propulsion technology, particularly the high-bypass feature has made engines much fatter.

With the 737 Max, Boeing wanted to use the most efficient engine available: the CFM International LEAP. A variant had already been chosen by Airbus for the updated version of its A320.
“Once Airbus said they’d use it and the A320 was going to become much more fuel efficient, Boeing had to do the same,” says Brady. “It would have been commercial suicide otherwise.” 
This presented a problem when fitting them to the 737-MAX, their solution being to mount them on pylons which project forwards from the wing. This solution however presented another problem - the aircraft balance and handling characteristics of the plane had been altered and it was found that the aircraft had a tendency to lift its nose upwards, particularly when it was already pitched at a steep angle.

This was unhelpful, because an excessively high “angle of attack,”  can cause an aerodynamic stall - suddenly robbing the wings of lift and causing the plane to lose altitude. It’s a situation flight crews would be careful to avoid.
Yet under these circumstances experienced pilots found the controls of the aircraft felt unfamiliar: unusually light, and rather different to what they had experienced with the previous generation of 737.

Boeing’s engineers developed a control system called MCAS - Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System - to ensure that the way the 737 Max behaved in the air remained consistent and matched that of previous generations of the plane.
This piece of software brings the nose of the aircraft down automatically, under very specific circumstances, without the intervention of the pilot.
Investigations into both 737 Max crashes are still under way, but the finger of suspicion has already been pointed firmly at MCAS.

What it does is relatively simple. It moves the horizontal stabilisers - the tail wings of the aircraft, which are normally used to help the aircraft maintain level flight - to bring the nose downward.
This has two effects: it increases pressure on the pilot’s control column, making the handling feel more familiar to experienced 737 pilots; and it reduces the risk of the nose rising too far and triggering a stall - although Boeing insists it is not an anti-stall system, and is simply there “to enhance the pitch stability of the airplane - so that it feels and flies like other 737s”.

What now seems apparent with the benefit of hindsight is that MCAS had design flaws.
First, it relied on data from a single angle of attack sensor, even though the aircraft had two of them. This type of sensor, in the nose of an aircraft, measures the angle at which it is encountering the airstream. But relying on only one of them meant that if it failed, the system could deploy at the wrong time, and push the nose of the aircraft down when it was supposed to be climbing, for example.

Second, although the pilot could use a thumb control to correct the pitch of the aircraft, MCAS would deploy repeatedly in cycles, forcing the nose down again and again. MCAS worked in the background, and it wasn’t until after the Lion Air crash that Boeing explained what it was and how it could be deactivated. It was not specifically mentioned in the flight manual - which is meant to give pilots the information they need to fly the aircraft safely.

Boeing emphasises that there are set procedures for pilots to follow, which are meant to help them deal with uncontrolled stabiliser movements, whatever their cause. These were contained in the manual, and should have been memorised by the pilots as well. It says the manual did tell crews to expect automatic stabiliser movements as the plane approached stalling speed, the “same type of aircraft behaviour” caused by MCAS. It has also pointed out that the day before the Lion Air crash, the same aircraft experienced similar problems, but was able to continue safely to its destination.

On that flight, within seconds of take-off, the airspeed and altitude indicators gave sharply different readings. Then the nose of the aircraft began moving down of its own accord. But this time, the pilots worked out what to do about it. They cut off power to the electronics operating the stabilisers and began controlling them manually. They may have been lucky, though. According to media reports, they were told what to do by a third pilot who happened to be in the cockpit, having hitched a ride aboard the plane.

Since these incidents, serious questions have been raised about the design of the MCAS software and whether the 737 Max was allowed into service despite a potential catastrophic flaw.
So what were the circumstances in which it was certified as safe to fly in the first place - and why was it not grounded when that flaw first came to light?
Many analysts are now pointing the finger at the close, even symbiotic, relationship between the company and the regulator responsible for aviation safety in the US, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Boeing and the FAA

The charge being levelled against the FAA is that it was a victim of so-called “regulatory capture”.
This is what happens when a government agency’s relationship with the industry it oversees becomes too close for comfort; instead of acting primarily in the interests of the public, it puts the needs of businesses first.
The FAA was responsible for certifying the 737 Max and giving it permission to fly.
Critics have suggested both that the agency was too slow to ground the plane and that the original certification process itself was flawed. Among them is US senator Richard Blumenthal. In a tense hearing organised by a Senate committee after the Ethiopian Airlines crash, he was scathing about the FAA’s alleged failings.

It had, he said, lagged behind other aviation authorities in preventing the 737 Max from flying. But more seriously, he said, it had “decided to do safety on the cheap… and put the fox in charge of the henhouse”. In other words, too much of the safety work on the plane had been outsourced to Boeing itself.
In the rush to produce the new aircraft, he argued, critical safety features had been disregarded.
Mary Schiavo, a former Inspector General at the US Department of Transportation who has been a thorn in the side of the FAA for many years, takes a similar view. During her tenure at the DoT in the mid-1990s, she oversaw an audit of the FAA’s work relating to the Boeing 777, and concluded that the bulk of the work was done by Boeing itself, with little real oversight.
“At the FAA, they know they’re outgunned by Boeing,” she says. “They know they don’t have the kind of resources they need to do the job they’re tasked with doing. They pretend to inspect, and Boeing pretends to be inspected, when in fact Boeing is doing it all almost entirely by itself.”

Barbara Lichman, an aviation lawyer and former Washington lobbyist, says it also has plenty of political power.
“Companies of that size have very proficient lobbyists,” she says. “They hit Congress very, very hard, and put pressure on them to relieve pressure on the company.” Whether or not politics were involved, the FAA certainly appeared reluctant at first to ground the 737 Max, far more so than other civil aviation authorities. On 11 March, the day after the Ethiopian Airlines flight 310 crashed, the FAA published a “continued airworthiness notification”, which in effect gave the aircraft the green light to continue flying.
Although it acknowledged that external reports were “drawing similarities” between the latest accident and the Lion Air disaster in October 2018, the agency insisted that as the investigation into the Ethiopian crash had just begun, it did not have sufficient data “to draw any conclusions or take any actions”.
Yet others were more cautious. China’s civil aviation authority was one of the first to order the grounding of the plane, along with Ethiopia, just a day after the accident. Many others followed suit. But it was not until 13 March that the FAA itself banned the plane from flying.

The more worrying accusation against the FAA, however, is that the entire process of certifying the aircraft as safe to fly was flawed - because most of the work was carried out by Boeing itself, and the agency failed to provide sufficient oversight. The FAA operates a system - known as the Organisation Designation Authorisation programme - which allows designated companies and individuals to carry out certification work on aircraft.

There is a good reason for this. Modern airliners are complex beasts, combining cutting-edge engineering with powerful computers that run software requiring millions of lines of code. The FAA, meanwhile, is a government institution with limited resources. By delegating some 90% of its certification work, in theory the agency is able to focus on oversight, ensuring that tasks are carried out properly, according to its own rules and procedures.

In the case of the 737 Max, critics believe that in its desperation to get the aircraft on to the market, the potential dangers of the MCAS system were not explored thoroughly enough - and the FAA failed to step in.
“Because Boeing knew whatever they did, and whatever they submitted [to the FAA], it was going to be certified. So, they got sloppy. Or sloppier,” says Mary Schiavo.

Both Boeing and the FAA entirely reject this. Nevertheless, since the Ethiopian Airlines accident, the Department of Transportation has set up an expert committee to review the FAA’s certification processes.

Meanwhile pressure on Boeing itself is mounting.
It is already facing a number of lawsuits from relatives of the victims of both crashes. Outside the company’s annual general meeting in late April, protesters called for chief executive Dennis Muilenburg to face prosecution. It is also being sued by some investors who claim the company concealed problems with the 737 Max and “effectively put profitability and growth ahead of airplane safety and honesty”.

Damaging information continues to emerge. In early May, Boeing admitted that a warning mechanism which should have been fitted as standard to the 737 Max would not work unless customers had also fitted a separate, paid-for cockpit display. The warning system, known as an AoA Disagree alert, was meant to tell pilots when the two angle of attack sensors on the aircraft were giving conflicting readings, in case one of them failed.

Engineers first became aware of the problem months before the Lion Air crash, but airlines were not informed until afterwards, and nor was the FAA - because Boeing staff believed it did not compromise safety.

A further evaluation was carried out after the accident - and this time Boeing says the FAA and airlines were informed.
Boeing continues to insist that the absence of the system was not safety-critical. It says:
“On every airplane delivered to our customers, including the MAX, all flight data and information needed to safely operate the aircraft is provided in the flight deck on the primary flight deck displays... Neither the angle of attack indicator nor the AOA Disagree alert are necessary for the safe operation of the airplane.”

But 737 expert Brady thinks the information it provided would still have been useful to the pilots in both stricken aircraft.
“I firmly believe that… any information or clue that helps you troubleshoot a problem and piece together what is happening has to be of value,” he says.

Meanwhile, the revelation has raised further questions about transparency at the aerospace giant - and whether or not it has failed to report any other potential safety concerns.

Looking ahead

Boeing has developed a software update to change the way MCAS works.
In future, the system will rely on information from two angle-of-attack sensors, rather than just one. If the two sensors give different readings, the pilots will be alerted to the fact and if they vary too much MCAS will simply be switched off.
There will be other safeguards, too - ensuring that the system can always be counteracted by the flight crew, and preventing it from deploying multiple times “in non-normal conditions”.

Boeing’s chief executive Muilenburg has pledged that once MCAS has been modified, the 737 Max will be one of the safest aircraft ever built.
Boeing still has more than 4,500 orders for the Max, and airlines want their new planes. Those efficiency improvements are still badly needed, and Airbus alone cannot hope to meet demand.
Production continues and the chances are most of those outstanding orders will be fulfilled, but that doesn't mean Boeing can simply get the aircraft flying and act as though nothing has happened.

The two accidents claimed the lives of 346 people. Formal investigations are ongoing, and more information may yet emerge. Relatives of the victims are demanding answers. There is a great deal of anger - and lawsuits are mounting up.

The US Department of Transportation is looking into the certification process for the 737 Max, and the Department of Justice is also taking an interest. It’s far from clear where these inquiries will lead, and what the outcome could mean for the company or its senior executives.

Nor should we forget the impact these accidents will have had on Boeing’s own employees. They were clearly proud of their new creation. They certainly did not intend to make a product that was in any way unsafe. Now, people within the aerospace giant say they feel “shattered” by what has happened.

Nevertheless, Boeing will almost certainly recover in the end. And despite the two tragedies, it is highly likely the 737 Max itself will be flying for decades to come.

Credits: Author: Theo Leggett     Additional reporting: Simon Browning     Producer: James Percy   Editor: Kathryn Westcot    Abridged by Newshound!

Why the AIRBUS A220 Could Be the Perfect Aircraft [4.15]

.

We start with an older accident report but included here as a teaching aid - why we let the engines spool up before ‘going full throttle’.

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27 DEC 2016 Boeing 737-85R (WL)  Jet Airways   Registration: VT-JBG C/n / msn: 35083/2535 First flight: 2008-02-27 (8 years 10 months)
Total: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 161     Aircraft damage: Substantial - Repaired

Jet Airways flight 2374, a Boeing 737-85R (WL), suffered a runway excursion at Goa-Dabolim Airport (GOI) in India.
The flight crew requested ATC for a pushback clearance at 04:52 local time. ATC cleared the flight to line up on runway 26 by entering Taxiway N1 and backtracking. The crew requested for an intersection departure, but this was not allowed by ATC. The starboard engine was started followed by start of port engine at 04:53.
At 05:01, as the aircraft was taxiing down th runway, ATC gave a departure clearance to the aircraft. It was cleared to Mumbai at FL220. The aircraft thereafter lined up on runway 26 after making a 180° turn at the turn pad. At 05:03, flight 2374 was cleared for take-off.
The crew completed the before take-off checklist and at 05:03 pushed the thrust levers to increase the thrust. After the Throttle Lever Angle (TLA) had passed 40%, the pilot in command pressed the TOGA button for takeoff.
As soon as TOGA was pressed, the aircraft started drifting towards the right. Within 10 to 12 seconds the aircraft went off the runway, onto the grass. The crew tried to apply brakes, rudder and use nosewheel steering to steer the aircraft. Due to heavy bumps they could not apply control effectively.
The aircraft stopped at a distance of 219 m from the runway edge and just short of perimeter road. In the process it had hit PAPI lights. The engine had hit a vertical pillar of 2.3 m in height, located at 92 m abeam the center line of runway 26. The pillar also damaged the left bottom portion of the fuselage.
The aircraft was evacuated after coming to rest. Sixteen passengers suffered minor injuries during the evacuation.

Probable Cause:
Probable cause of the Accident: "The PIC pressed TOGA when the thrust on no.1 engine was 40% and no.2 engine was 28% in deviation from SOP, which caused the No.1 engine thrust to increase at a faster rate than no.2 resulting in aircraft yawing towards right. In the absence of timely desired corrective actions including reject takeoff, the aircraft veered off the runway and continued to move in a semicircular arc on the undulated ground resulting in substantial damages to the aircraft."

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05 MAY 2019   Sukhoi SU95   Aeroflot    RA-89098    C/n: 77310804  First flight: 1977
Total: Fatalities: 41 / Occupants: 78       Aircraft fate: Written off (damaged beyond repair) Location: Sheremetyevo Airport (Russia)

An Aeroflot Sukhoi Superjet 100-95, performing flight SU-1492 from Moscow Sheremetyevo to Murmansk (Russia) with 73 passengers and 5 crew, departed Sheremetyevo's runway 24C at 18:04L (15:04Z) but stopped the climb at about FL100 following a lightning strike, declared loss of radio communication first, later emergency via transponder codes and returned to Sherementyevo for a landing on runway 24L at 18:31L (15:31Z). During the roll out the aircraft burst into flames, veered left off the runway and came to a stop on the grass adjacent to the runway, the aircraft burned down. 41 occupants perished in the accident (28 occupants still missing were declared dead), 35 occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft via both front door emergency slides, the 2 flight crew escaped via the escape ropes through the cockpit windows, there were 11 injuries. The aircraft's tail section completely burned down and was destroyed.

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15 June 2019 Boeing 757-224 (WL)  United Airlines Registration: N26123 C/n / msn: 28966/781 First flight: 1997-11-30 (21 years 7 months)
Total: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 166     Aircraft damage: Substantial

United Airlines flight 627, a Boeing 757-224, sustained substantial damage to the forward fuselage following a hard landing accident at Newark-Liberty International Airport, New Jersey, USA.
The flight departed Denver International Airport, Colorado at 07:51 hours local time (13:51 UTC) on a scheduled service to Newark.
The aircraft landed on runway 22L at 12:55 local time (16:55 UTC). Preliminary reports indicate that the aircraft bounced on landing and veered off the left side of the runway. The aircraft came to rest with the left main gear and nose landing gear to the left of the runway shoulder, but still on the paved surface.
 

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27 JUN 2019   Antonov An-24RV   Angara Airlines    RA-47366    C/n: 77310804  First flight: 1977
Total: Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 46       Aircraft fate: Written off (damaged beyond repair) Location: Nizhneangarsk Airport (Russia)

An Antonov An-24RV of Angara Airlines hit a building following a runway excursion on landing at Nizhneangarsk Airport, Russia. The aircraft had departed Ulan-Ude for Nizhneangarsk. While en route one of the engines reportedly failed. During landing rollout on runway 22 at Nizhneangarsk Airport, the aircraft veered off the right side of the runway and travelled across grass until it impacted a building of a sewage treatment plant. A fire erupted. The captain and flight engineer were killed and 22 passengers were injured.
 

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Flightsim News

Microsoft Flight Simulator - E3 2019 - Announce Trailer

Coming 2020, Microsoft Flight Simulator is the next generation of one of the most beloved simulation franchises. From light planes to wide-body jets, fly highly detailed and stunning aircraft in an incredibly realistic world. Create your flight plan and fly anywhere on the planet. Enjoy flying

UK2000 Timeline and GSX2 Improvements

UK2000 Scenery has confirmed that they are developing 3 key airports with the new technology they said they were working on. Those airports are Bristol, Luton and Glasgow. Dubbed as the 2020 edition, these new airports will reflect their representative airport in the current state.

In terms of timelines, Glasgow is looking to be released at the end of 2019, Luton early 2020 (possibly late 2019) and Bristol will be the last of the 3 with a ETA of 2020.

The team are looking for anyone who can support with pictures or other information at those airports. Simply go to their forums or email their support line suppoer4 [at] uk2000scenery [dot] com.

The new airports will be made for FSX and P3D, with X-Plane editions following afterwards. The next generation airports of UK2000 Scenery will benefit from new objects, new design techniques, with more details and visual effects including PBR materials. At UK2000 Scenery, new and improved files for the jetways of GSX2 are ready for download for direct use with the following airports if you have them : Gatwick, Manchester, Newcastle and Glasgow. The UK2000 Common Library 3.62 is also required.

Uk2000 Scenery New High-res Airstairs

 Inverness Xtreme 2019

UK2000 Scenery has released their all-new Inverness Xtreme 2019. Inverness airport, in the North of Scotland, is surrounded by plenty of natural beauty, which makes for some stunning approaches into the airport. Various airlines from the UK and Europe frequent the airport to destinations such as Amsterdam, Zurich and London Heathrow. Inverness Xtreme 2019 from UK2000 Scenery represents the all-new HD scenery packages coming from the team. With a focus on new high-quality buildings and texture work to also include features such as specular, bump and window reflections will be used on the main buildings and true PBR materials. The airport product also features night lighting, detailed airport vehicles, runway wigwags and various static aircraft.

Prepar3D V4.5 Update

The main improvements are the terrain night lighting and the improved rendering performance.

Terrain night lighting has been overhauled adding greater visual detail and clarity. Highways illuminate through cityscapes like never before and sprawling urban environments come to life extending to the horizon with higher resolution night textures.

Major optimizations have been made to model loading vastly reducing load times for complex scenery add-ons. Additional enhancements were made across the entire platform ranging from smoother multiplayer animations, greater Virtual Reality (VR) performance, to improved Physically Based Rendering (PBR) lighting and color balance.

[P3Dv4.5]FSLabs A320X With REX Enviroment Force|| Wellington || RNAV approach Rwy 16

I couldn’t find a (interesting) video specifcally on the update so here is a video made using the latest update.

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*OPINION* - MICROSOFT FLIGHT SIMULATOR 2020 [19.01]

Trigger warning for the more delicate among you. This video is My Personal Opinion on the recent announcement about Microsoft Flight Simulator. My opinions, my guesses as to what the future may hold, and my general misgivings may well conflict with yours.  If that's the case, you may want to skip this video to save yourself some stress and angst.

Spoiler alert: If you're foaming at the mouth about the new sim, then yes, my opinions are different to yours.

Australia V2 for P3D and FSX: Official Announcement!

G'day everyone,
It is with a great deal of excitement that the team is proud to announce our latest region for FSX & Prepar3D, Orbx AU Australia V2!

A monumental redesign of one of our most beloved products, AUv2 brings to life the entirety of the Australian continent with the latest region-based technology. Clocking in at a staggering 8 million square kilometres, AUv2 incorporates an enormous diversity of topography and geography. From the tropical rain forests of far-north Queensland to the wind-swept coastline of south-west Tasmania; from the temperate urban metropolises of the east coast to the desolate beauty of the red centre, explore a variety of stunning landscapes not seen anywhere else in the Orbx world.

 

AUv2 is a landclass-style region that brings together everything on a massive scale. Almost 700 airports have been upgraded or created from scratch, giving you the perfect opportunity to criss-cross the country in true VFR style. Coastlines, waterbodies, road, rail and powerline networks have been recreated from scratch, using the latest high-fidelity data to vastly improve accuracy and detail across the continent. Towns, urban centres and other settlements have been reworked too; diversity, realism and accuracy greatly improve the immersion, whether that be flying cross-country long-haul or local VFR hops. Terrain elevation mesh has been brought to the next level; incorporating the latest data from the Australian Government, the new HD mesh makes a huge difference on both a small and large scale. In addition to these major re-workings, over 50 large-scale photoreal points of interest have been created from scratch to represent well-known geographical and man-made features. Mine sites, dry lakes, tidal water bodies, unusual geographical formations and more have been expertly edited, colourised and blended to the surrounding terrain. The largest of these features is the Great Barrier Reef; recreated in complete photoreal quality, this feature alone is larger than many of our existing regions!

https://orbxsystems.com/forum/

AUv2 FEATURE LIST

• Our largest and most popular region; 8 million sq km in full Orbx region quality
• Ultra-HD Melbourne Cityscape
• 370+ upgraded  and  280+ all-new  airports
• Over  50+ large-scale photoreal areas of interest  such as salt lakes, mine sites, tidal areas and many more
• High-quality mesh, with high-resolution LIDAR data for the majority of the eastern/southern seaboard, major cities and Tasmania
• Completely new lakes, rivers and shorelines - much improved quality and accuracy
• Entire  Great Barrier Reef  in photoreal
• Completely new road and rail networks
• Improved and new landclass types
• Hundreds of thousands of new geographical features; dry lakes, parks, railyards, industrial areas etc
• Much-improved populated area shape accuracy
• Completely new  powerline networks, windfarms and other man-made features
• Improved and updated bridges, harbour objects and marinas
• Complete seasonal variations
• Airports optimised for use with AI traffic, particularly our enormously-popular  AI Traffic for Australia
• Designed to work seamlessly with all  32 Australian HD airports and Cityscapes  (on sale until the end of May!)
• Completely compatible with  FSX, FSX:SE and P3Dv1-v4

FAQ

Q. I own FTX AU (v1), am I eligible for some kind of discount? A. As long as you have a copy of FTX AU v1 in your OrbxDirect account, a discount of 40% will be automatically applied at check-out.
Q. How much disk space will AUv2 take up? A. Current installed size is approx 21GB, though this is subject to change for final release
Q. Will all my Orbx payware Australian airports work with AUv2? A. Yes. Graham is currently working through all HD airports to correct any compatibility issues.
Q. I have a third-party mesh installed, will I need this for Australia? A. No. The mesh shipped with AUv2 is the best quality and resolution currently available on the market.

PRICING

Orbx AUv2 will be available exclusively via OrbxDirect for AUD $54.95 (approx. USD $38.50/ €34.25 / £29.50). AUv1 customers who have a copy in their OrbxDirect account will receive a 40% discount. 

Orbx Announces EGJA Alderney and EGLC London City Airport for FSX and P3D

Announced by John Venema on the Orbx forums, he said that EGJA Alderney Airport had been kept quiet as a little surprise for the community. The post was very light on details, however, John did share some preview images of a pre-beta version of the product.

According to the post, Greg Jones from Turbulent Designs is involved with development. We are unsure if all of the Turbulent Designs team are involved in the project at this point.

In other Orbx news, they showed the first previews of London City for Prepar3D – the first full PBR airport for the team in P3D.

REX 5

A brief look at the new real-time dynamic living environment, weather & visibility smoothing and cloud life cycles from REX Environment Force. The time-lapse also utilizes the Sky Force real-time weather engine, cloud models and textures.

 Future in the Environment!  their app handles shaders in P3D to bring life and realtime changing elements in the simulator : clouds shaping or dissipating, light and shade updated live according to weather conditions, and much more.
http://www.rexsimulations.com/envforce.html

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Is The GSX PBR Update Any Good? First Impressions! [Prepar3D v4.5] [15.05]

Checking out one of the biggest updates GSX has ever had and seeing where it fails and succeeds :)
 

Flight1 Garmin GTN 750 GPS Review and Tutorial (FSX/FSX:SE/P3D) [20.42]

Join me as I take a thorough look at the F1GTN 750 for FSX, FSX:SE and Prepar3D.

 

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